Philosophers on Social Justice
Philosophers on Social Justice
Samuel Fleischacker: “’Distributive justice,’ also called ‘social justice, ’ or economic justice, . . . in its modern sense calls on the state to guarantee that property is distributed throughout society so that everyone is supplied with a certain level of material means” (A Short History of Distributive Justice, 2004, p. 1 and p. 4).
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“Debates about distributive justice tend to center on the amount of means to be guaranteed and on the degree to which state intervention is necessary for those means to be distributed” (A Short History of Distributive Justice, 2004, pp. 4-5).
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“But even Nozick does not doubt that the phrase ‘distributive justice’ has always been understood to apply to the distribution of property, by the state, and for the needy” (A Short History of Distributive Justice, 2004, Kindle Locations 95-96).
Brian Barry: “And it goes without saying that it would be a complete waste of time to talk about the just distribution of resources unless the redistribution of property by the state was on the agenda” (Why Social Justice Matters, 2005, p. 22).
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“But if we take seriously the idea that social justice is about (among other things) what incomes people enjoy after taxes and transfers, the Commission’s way of looking at it is simply frivolous” (Why Social Justice Matters, 2005, p. 9).
Thomas Patrick Burke: “These four qualities we have here outlined are necessary features of any genuine conception of justice, but they are not features of ‘social justice.’ We are not, therefore, merely arguing that ordinary justice and ‘social justice’ are different, but that they are in conflict with one another, and that of the two only ordinary justice is genuine justice. ‘Social justice’ is not justice at all” (Concept of Justice: Is Social Justice Just?, 2011, p. 28).
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“But in all these cases a state of affairs is being imputed to the will of an agent. This idea of ‘imputation’ is one that I will discuss in detail later. For the present it is sufficient to recognize that the will is manifest in many ways: as intention, as omission, as neglect, as ‘acting in ignorance.’ All these are ways in which someone makes himself responsible for the causal consequences of his own behavior. And in the end it is this idea of responsibility that is pivotal for understanding the concept of justice. Where there is injustice, there is somebody responsible for it. And where there is no one responsible, there cannot be injustice. The idea that there can be ‘social injustice,’ even though there is no agent to whom this can be imputed, is incoherent” (Concept of Justice: Is Social Justice Just?, 2011, p. 2).
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“'Social justice’ is a demand addressed to society as a whole and not to the individual; and as such it is a demand that can be met only by the state. To make 'social justice' into the basic principle of social order is to endorse the wholesale transfer of responsibility from individuals to the state, and inevitably to endorse the expansion of the state and the increase of its coercive powers” (Concept of Justice: Is Social Justice Just?, 2011, p. 3).
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“The theory of ‘social justice’ as currently understood in our society rejects each of these presuppositions. It denies or at least minimizes the role of free will, and so of individual responsibility, and of action, and marginalizes likewise the traditional concepts of desert, of guilt and innocence, of praise and blame, and of reward and punishment. From the traditional viewpoint, whatever is unjust is also unfair or unequal, but the proposition cannot be inverted: not everything that is unequal is necessarily unjust. There is a difference between justice and fairness. In the new view, however, justice is identified with fairness. Whatever is unequal or unfair is by that very fact considered unjust. This is so even if the subject matter of judgment is not an action but a state of affairs. And that unequal state of affairs is unjust no matter how it came about. So we have the bizarre situation that a state of affairs can be labeled ‘unjust’ even though no one has done anything wrong in producing or permitting it, or indeed done anything to produce it” (Concept of Justice: Is Social Justice Just?, 2011, pp. 12-13).
John Hospers: “Those who are engaged in ‘social engineering’ often characterize the concept of individual justice, described above, as outdated. What we need, they say, is social justice.
But what exactly does this term mean? If justice is treatment in accord with desert, and deserts are unequal, then justice demands that treatments also be unequal. If everyone were given the same wage regardless of effort or achievement, we would have a society in which hardly anyone would choose to work at all; in the end there would be nothing left to distribute, and starvation would stalk the land. The ideal of justice as complete egalitarianism—everyone receives the same regardless of who does what or how much, or even if they do nothing at all—is contradicted by the most elementary facts of reality. It is not the idea of forcible redistribution that deters egalitarians—they have no objections at all to that—but only the fact that once the goose has been killed it can lay no more eggs” (“Justice Versus Social Justice,” The Freeman, Jan. 1985, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/justice-versus-social-justice/, accessed Nov. 29, 2011).
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“Proponents of ‘social justice’ do not, then, usually demand that every person (or every family) receive the same income. For reasons of sheer survival, this is not done even in the Soviet Union. What the proponents of ‘social justice’ do demand, however, is that everyone, regardless of effort, ability, or achievement, receive a ‘decent standard of living’-which in urban America may include not only food, clothing, and shelter, but a telephone, a television set, and convenient means of transportation as ‘necessities of life.’ And who shall be required to pay for these things? Those whose income is higher; ‘justice demands’ that those who are ‘more fortunate’ be required to contribute to those who are ‘less fortunate.’ These are the popular name tags, and the underlying assumption is that if one person has more and another less, this is solely a matter of ‘luck’ or ‘fortune,’ as if somehow individual ability and initiative had nothing to do with improving one’s lot.
It is far from clear, however, how A being forced to give part of his paycheck to B is an example of justice: it would seem to be a case of injustice to A, and a windfall for B. And even if such transfer payments should be made, should they be done in the name of justice? The basis of justice is desert; the basis of charity is need: in charity, we give to others because they need it; in justice, we receive compensation (or punishment) because we deserve it. The difference between justice and charity should not be obscured” (“Justice Versus Social Justice,” The Freeman, Jan. 1985, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/justice-versus-social-justice/, accessed Nov. 29, 2011).
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“It will be apparent by now that the demands of ‘social justice’ are incompatible with those of individual justice; to the extent that the first demand is met, the second must be sacrificed. If the government takes money out of Peter’s wallet to put it in Paul’s, it may have achieved greater equality, but not greater justice. It is impossible for individuals to receive a just wage on a free market and then be forced to part with a portion of it, for then they receive less than a just wage” (“Justice Versus Social Justice,” The Freeman, Jan. 1985, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/justice-versus-social-justice/, accessed Nov. 29, 2011).
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“The final irony is that the ideals of the champions of “social justice” are not even achieved when they are put fully into practice. Because people will not—and cannot—produce indefinitely without compensation, the final result of massive transfer payments is equality of zero—universal destitution. That, after all, is how the excesses of the late Roman welfare state gave way to the destitution of the Dark Ages It has happened many times in history, and it could happen again if the proponents of ‘social justice’—that is, enforced collectivism—push their demands so far as to cancel out the requirements of individual justice” (“Justice Versus Social Justice,” The Freeman, Jan. 1985, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/justice-versus-social-justice/, accessed Nov. 29, 2011).
Tibor Machan: “Social justice is neither social, nor just. It is an excuse for some people to run everyone else’s life” (“Column on Dyson’s Nonsense,” Oct 30, 2011, http://szatyor2693.wordpress.com/, accessed Dec. 1, 2011).
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“Distribution is something done by people who have things to distribute, who are legitimate, rightful owners of what may be wanted from them about town. Money, mainly. So in our day government takes money from people –the resources they have made, earned, found, won or whatever – and hands it to some other people (after taking a good cut for itself). How the distribution goes may be judged as arbitrary, fair, unfair, corrupt, or, just. But all this couldn’t even begin if it were determined that the initial taking of the resources is wrong. And as I have managed to figure these matters, taxing people is wrong. That means that distributing what is taken in taxes is also wrong. Accordingly distributive justice could not be justice at all. It is at most something touched by a bit of generosity, as when bank robbers divvy up their loot among some needy folks, in what is taken to be a Robin Hoodish way (but Robin just took money back that had been taken in taxes instead of taxed people)” (“On Distributive Justice” retrieved May 16, 2012 http://tibormachan.rationalreview.com/tag/social-justice/).
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“When one hears of distributive justice – or another version of this oxymoron, social justice – it is best to conjure up the idea of a square circle or worse, a free slave. Governments that have resources to distribute came by it unjustly, by seizing it from people who are the just holders of those resources” (“On Distributive Justice” retrieved May 16, 2012 http://tibormachan.rationalreview.com/tag/social-justice/).
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“So upon close examination it emerges that Left-libertarianism belongs among efforts, like some others by some people on the Left and the Right, to appropriate a concept alien to its logical purpose. This includes such notions as positive rights, positive liberty, welfare rights, and social justice. Many invoke these notions, but quite arguably they are conceptual corruptions, however much one twists and turns to attempt to render them distinctly meaningful. (Of course, it is not possible to say this with finality, since, for example, tomorrow morning someone could well come up with a use of the idea that has merit.) These notions may not amount to an outright self-contradiction, such as ‘square circle,’ but on analysis they come close” (“Machan’s Archives: Left Libertarianism: Oxymoron?” No Date, retrieved May 16, 2012 http://tibormachan.rationalreview.com/2012/05/machans-archives-left-libertarianism-oxymoron/).
Roger Scruton: “Robin Hood acts unjustly (by taking what he has no right to take) in order to bring about social justice.” (Dictionary of Political Thought,1982, quoted in The Oxford English Dictionary).
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“Some object, however, that until something is produced, there are no benefits to distribute, and the very fact of production might create rights in the thing produced which would be violated by any distribution that does not have the consent of the producer. If that is so, then the whole picture of social justice as a form of distribution might involve a covert affirmation of a kind of agency in an area where there is no agency, and a right of control where there is no such right” (Dictionary of Political Thought, 1991, p. 433).
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“A system that offered to children from poor families an opportunity to advance by talent and industry alone was destroyed for the simple reason that it divided the successes from the failures. Of course, it is a tautology to say that tests divide successes from failures, and it can hardly be a requirement of justice to abolish that distinction. But the new concept of ‘social’ justice came to the rescue of the egalitarians, and enabled them to present their malice towards the successful as a bid for justice on behalf of the rest” (The Uses of Pessimism : And the Danger of False Hope, 2010, p. 96, Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition).
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“The routine among politicians and educational experts is to hunt out places of excellence – Oxbridge, public schools, grammar schools, choir schools – and find ways to penalize them or to close them down. That way, the fallacy tells us, the others will benefit, and we will at last have an educational system that conforms to the requirements of ‘social justice’” (The Uses of Pessimism: And the Danger of False Hope, 2010, p. 97, Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition).
David Kelley: “[W]hat exactly does the term ‘altruism’ mean? On the one hand, it can mean nothing more than kindness or common courtesy. On the other hand, it can mean the complete submersion of the self in a larger social whole. This was the meaning Auguste Comte intended when he coined the term. ‘To live for others,’ ‘to become incorporate with Humanity’—these, he said, were the cardinal virtues of his ‘religion of Humanity.’ Altruism in this deeper sense, I will argue, is the basis for the various concepts of ‘social justice’ that are used to defend government programs that redistribute wealth. My goal...is to show that this principle of altruism is not compatible with the recognition of the individual as an end in himself, and should therefore be rejected” (“Capitalism and Altruism,” 1991, http://www.atlassociety.org/altruism_capitalism, accessed Feb. 3, 2012).
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“The critics of the market have always capitalized on these doubts about its morality. The socialist movement was sustained by allegations that capitalism breeds selfishness, exploitation, alienation, injustice. In milder forms, this same belief produced the welfare state, which redistributes income through government programs in the name of ‘social justice.’ Capitalism has never escaped the moral ambiguity in which it was conceived. It is valued for the prosperity it brings; it is valued as a necessary precondition for political and intellectual freedom. But few of its defenders are prepared to assert that the mode of life central to capitalism—the pursuit of self-interest through production and trade—is morally honorable, much less noble or ideal.
There is no mystery about where the moral antipathy toward the market comes from. It arises from the ethics of altruism, which is deeply rooted in Western culture, as indeed in most cultures. By the standards of altruism, the pursuit of self-interest is at best a neutral act, outside the realm of morality, and at worst a sin. It is true that success in the market is achieved by voluntary trade, and thus by satisfying the needs of others. But it is also true that those who do succeed are motivated by personal gain, and ethics is as much concerned with motives as with results.
In everyday speech, the term ‘altruism’ is often taken to mean nothing more than kindness or common courtesy. But its real meaning, historically and philosophically, is self-sacrifice. For the socialists who coined the term, it meant the complete submersion of the self in a larger social whole. As Ayn Rand put it, ‘The basic principle of altruism is that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification of his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue, and value’. Altruism in this strict sense is the basis for the various concepts of ‘social justice’ that are used to defend government programs for redistributing wealth. Those programs represent the compulsory sacrifice of the people taxed to support them. They represent the use of individuals as collective resources, to be used as means to the ends of others. And that is the fundamental reason why they should be opposed on moral grounds by anyone who defends capitalism” (“The Fourth Revolution,” 2009, http://www.atlassociety.org/tni/fourth-revolution, accessed Oct 7, 2013).
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“In other words, every form of social justice rests on the assumption that individual ability is a social asset. The assumption is not merely that the individual may not use his talents to trample on the rights of the less able. Nor does the assumption say merely that kindness or generosity are virtues. It says that the individual must regard himself, in part at least, as a means to the good of others. And here we come to the crux of the matter. In respecting the rights of other people, I recognize that they are ends in themselves, that I may not treat them merely as a means to my satisfaction, in the way that I treat inanimate objects. Why then is it not equally moral to regard myself as an end? Why should I not refuse, out of respect for my own dignity as a moral being, to regard myself as a means in the service of others” (“The Fourth Revolution,” http://www.atlassociety.org/tni/fourth-revolution, accessed Oct 7, 2013).
Peter Singer: “This is a question on which the historical record is relevant. The course taken by several revolutions – from the French revolution of 1789 to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and, perhaps most horrifically of all, the rule of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia – must shake the belief that a burning desire for social justice provides immunity to the corrupting effects of violence. There are other examples that may be read the other way; but it would take a considerable number of examples to outweigh the legacy of Robespierre, Stalin and Pol Pot” (Practical Ethics, 3r Ed., p. 273).
Wendy McElroy: “Marxism and feminism are both theories of the distribution of political power. Post-Marxist feminists propose to distribute power, not through equality, but through their vision of social justice. That is, they do not seek equality under the law but a total restructuring of the law itself and of the system creating the law. They seek to impose sexually correct attitudes and behavior in both the economic and the personal realm. And the success of their campaign has been partly due to the strategy they have adopted” (Sexual-Correctness: The Gender-Feminist Attack on Women, 1996, p. 14, accessed through Google Books http://books.google.com/books?id=BiEP-j9rh8AC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false, accessed Oct 7, 2013).
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“But what about couples wish to maintain a more traditional marriage? What of those women who want to work out the terms of their family structure for themselves with their husbands? Okin argues that such personal desires are irrelevant; the family is too important a social institution to be abandoned to the arbitrary wishes of the individuals involved.
The terms on which a family divides up housekeeping may seem to be the business of individuals involved, but in reality it is a matter of social justice. The state must dictate the terms of family life to ensure equity. Okin’s specific recommendations for making families just would require nothing less than a total restructuring of the economy. For example, with reference to providing a salary for housewives, Okin suggests that both spouses should have a legal entitlement to every cent coming into the house: ‘The simplest way of doing this would be to have employers make out wage checks equally divided between the earner and the partner who provides all or most of his or her unpaid domestic services.’
This is the logical and inevitable extension of the principle, ‘The personal is political’” (Sexual Correctness: The Gender-Feminist Attack on Women, 1996, p.114).
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Question Posed to McElroy: “Is the free-market enough to allow a full emancipation of women, or should the government intervene in order to reduce the gender gap and change things more rapidly?”
Response: “The answer depends on what you mean by ‘full mancipation’; frankly, I think every individual has to decide its personal meaning for themselves. But if you mean ‘complete fairness’ or ‘social justice,’ then ‘no’, the free market will not provide that in and by itself. Other peaceful forces may well be necessary, such as moral suasion applied to those who are unfair, offensive, denigrating, etc.; this is largely what happened in the American civil rights movement before it was co-opted by government. What I do contend about the free market is that it delivers emancipation better than any other competing system, such as state interference. Indeed, any governmental interference aimed at providing social justice actually provides the opposite. That is to say, it violates individual rights which must be the basis of all justice” (Laissez Faire Today: The Laissez Faire Club Daily e-Letter, “Interview with Wendy McElroy on Feminism in America” Feb 21, 2012, http://lfb.org/today/interview-with-wendy-mcelroy-on-feminism-in-america/#sthash.3nZMRLkF.dpuf, accessed Oct 7, 2013).
Leonard Peikoff: “In this view, certain men, such as the needy, become ‘deserving’ in a new, invalid definition of the term. They ‘deserve’ to receive values simply because they lack and wish for them—as a recompense for no action, as a payment for no achievement, in exchange for nothing. In this approach, the ‘deserved’ is turned into a caprice; the concept is thus vitiated and the virtue of justice swept aside. It is replaced by what is called ‘social justice,’ which policy consists in expropriating the creators in order to reward the noncreators” (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, 1993, p. 287, Plume, Kindle Edition).
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“There are only two fundamental methods by which men can deal with one another: by reason or by force, by intellectual persuasion or by physical coercion, by directing to an opponent’s brain an argument—or a bullet. Since the Nazis dismiss reason out of hand, their only recourse is to embrace the second of these methods. The Nazi ethics completes the job of brute-worship: altruism gives to the use of force a moral sanction, making it not only an unavoidable practical recourse, but also a positive virtue, an expression of militant righteousness. A man is morally the property of others—of those others it is his duty to serve—argue Fichte, Hegel, and the rest, explicitly or by implication. As such, a man has no moral right to refuse to make the requisite sacrifices for others. If he attempts [to refuse making sacrifices for others, thus making himself a non-sacrificial individual]l, he is depriving men of what is properly theirs, he is violating men’s rights, their right to his service—and it is, therefore, an assertion of morality if others intervene forcibly and compel him to fulfill his obligations. ‘Social justice’ in this view not only allows but demands the use of force against the non-sacrificial individual; it demands that others put a stop to his evil. Thus has moral fervor been joined to the rule of physical force, raising it from a criminal tactic to a governing principle of human relationships” (Ominous Parallels, 1983, p. 91, Plume, Kindle Edition.)
Erick Mack: “Were I attracted to social justice and the common good as Gregg understands them, I too would be interested in rescuing ‘social justice’ from the grip of those ‘identified as "left-wing" or "progressive.”’ But since I’m not, I’m not. So my purpose here is not to rescue social justice but, rather, to weigh it down and sink it. More specifically, I want to say a few things about why one should disavow the common egalitarian or egalitarian-leaning conceptions of social justice for which Gregg wishes to offer a substitute” (“Social Justice is the State,” Apr 1, 2013, http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/social-justice-is-the-state/, accessed Oct 7, 2013).
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“I have said that a state devoted to a conception of social justice of the sort under consideration here might be convinced by its pro-freedom and pro-market advisors to adopt something like classical liberal policies. However, I would not advise anyone to hold her breath. In practice, the demand for social justice functions as a blank check that is almost always filled in and cashed by concentrated special interests – often at the expense of those who are supposed to be served by social justice. Social justice, however, is not among the innocent victims. Social justice is so inherently indeterminate that almost any politically savvy interest can wrap itself in the social justice flag. Social justice necessarily champions extensive state authority. It necessary champions the idea that the social order is an organization and that the executive branch of that organization, i.e., the state, has the final say in distributing the burdens and benefits of being part of the organization. All of this is what I mean to say in my not very hyperbolic title” (“Social Justice is the State,” Apr 1, 2013, http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/social-justice-is-the-state/, accessed Oct. 7, 2013).
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“F.A. Hayek makes a large number of weak or misdirected arguments against social justice. However, one of his better arguments is simply to point out that, since the institution of any such doctrine of social justice will almost certainly require the use of the state’s coercive powers, the advocate of any such doctrine bears the burden of establishing that ‘there exists a moral duty to submit to [such] a power.’ Hayek’s important point is that the application of the phrase ‘social justice’ to some purportedly better or more fair pattern of distribution does not discharge the burden of establishing a duty to submit to the coercive imposition of that pattern. I contend that it is a universal feature of advocates of social justice that they do not discharge that burden. That is part of what I mean to convey in my slightly hyperbolic title” (“Social Justice is the State,” Apr 1, 2013, http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/social-justice-is-the-state/, accessed Oct. 7, 2013).
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“Indeed, it is in the nature of arguments for egalitarian or egalitarian-leaning doctrines of social justice to begin with the assumption that society or society’s state has authority over whatever goods are in practice available for distribution. The starting presumption is that whatever goods are in practice available for distribution are part of a social pie which – however it has come into existence – is now sitting there waiting to be cut up in accord with the reigning recipe for social justice” (“Social Justice is the State,” Apr 1, 2013, http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/social-justice-is-the-state/, accessed Oct. 7, 2013).
Helmut Schoeck: “In a book on the British middle class, written after the Second World War, during the time of the Labor Government, the two authors consider the motivational complex of ‘social justice,’ of leveling down to achieve greater ‘equality,’ and, without any circumlocution, they call the real motive ‘envy’” (Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior, 1969, p. 292).
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“An obstacle to the clarification of this problem is Tournier’s occasional uncritical use of the term ‘social justice,’ which conceals from him that any inequality, however insignificant and unavoidable, can be an occasion for envy and its counterpart, the sense of social guilt” (Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior, 1969, pp. 318-19).
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“A politically dangerous spiral begins at the point where economic policy is based on the assumption that the many can be well off only if the few are not better off; or if the income or the wealth of a polity is understood as a fixed quantity, so that ‘social justice’ can be practiced only through the sacrifice of the minority, in order that the rest should ‘feel better’ about things” (Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior, 1969, p. 369).
Bill Vallicella: “Novak seems to think that there is such a thing as social justice ‘rightly understood.’ I am not convinced that right-thinking people should use the term at all. The Left has destroyed it and now they own it. Anyway, what is wrong with plain old 'justice'? How could justice fail to be social? 'Social justice' as currently used carries a load of leftist baggage. As I have said many times, if you are a conservative, don't talk like a (contemporary) liberal. Don't use question-begging phrases and epithets such as 'social justice,' 'Islamophobe,' and 'homophobe.' Never acquiesce in the Left's acts of linguistic vandalism. If you let them command the terms of the debate, you will lose. Insist on clarity of expression and definition of terms. Language matters” (“What is Social Justice,” March 12, 2012, http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2012/03/what-is-social-justice.html, accessed Sept. 23, 2013).
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“I therefore agree that we conservatives should never use 'social justice,' or 'economic justice' for that matter. Beyond that, we might take to using 'socialist justice' as an informative and accurate way of referring to what leftists call social justice” (“Social Justice or Subsidiarity?”, April 6, 2012, http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2012/04/social-justice-or-subsidiarity.html, accessed Sept 23, 2013).
Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl: “We explain liberalism’s problem in detail and show that it is a basic problem of political philosophy and one that in various forms has been the concern of many modern political philosophers. Briefly stated, liberalism’s problem asks: What are the principles by which to establish a political and legal order whose structure will allow for the possibility that different individuals might be able to flourish and realize virtue in very different ways? We argue that the key to solving liberalism’s problem is the protection of the possibility of self-direction, since self-direction is the common critical element in all the concrete forms of human flourishing. We use this insight as the basis for our claim that the basic, negative, natural right to liberty is, together with its corollary rights of life and property, a meta-normative principle, because it protects the possibility of self-direction in a social context. We further argue that such concepts as ‘social justice’ and ‘the common good of the political community’ are, as normally understood, not meta-normative principles and that no ethical principles associated with these concepts, nor any other ethical principles for that matter, can claim priority over the basic right to liberty as a meta-normative principle. Overall, we defend, then, what we call ‘liberalism’s basic tenet’ – namely, that protecting liberty, as understood in terms of basic negative rights, should be the paramount aim of the political and legal order” (Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics, 2005, p. xiv).
Anthony de Jasay: “Part One of this essay is a bird's eye review of some attempts to make social justice intellectually respectable by reconciling it with justice in general. Part Two will deal with the attempt to reconcile us to the advancing welfare state, seen as the bittersweet result of administering social justice. I cannot explain the reason why, but I find it truly striking that all these attempts massively resort to economic theory of one sort or another. With the exception of orthodox Marxism, they all aim at performing an almost acrobatic feat: justifying the placing of the burden on the better-off of redressing an alleged injustice suffered by the worse-off, without making any sort of case that the better-off are guilty of it” (“Economic Theories and Social Justice,” May 3, 2004, http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2004/Jasayluck.html,).
Kelley Ross: “Ayn Rand once said that the political right and the political left both allow individual freedom in just the matters that they do not think are important. Thus, people on the political right think that personal morality is the most important thing, so they are willing to allow freedom when it comes to property and economic matters but at the same time wish to legislate morality. Since many on the political right are religiously motivated, their preferences may be simply stated: That in the matters where ‘you can't take it with you,’ they allow freedom, while personal practices that may offend God are cause for legal and political attention.
On the other hand, people on the political left don't care so much about personal practices, and probably don't give much weight to the moral prohibitions and requirements of traditional religions, whether they happen to believe in a traditional God or not. Less concerned with hellfire and brimstone in the hereafter, the rewards and punishments of the present world are the preoccupation instead, usually in so far as these seem to be morally deserved or undeserved. Instead of divine justice, social justice -- or perhaps a sense that divine justice would be social justice. Thus, since the proper distribution of rewards in society is thought of as a matter of judicial or political decision, the political left is hostile to economic freedom and the free market, which do not appear to distribute wealth and rewards according to deserts (or ‘need’)” (“Liberty in Two Dimensions,” No Date, http://www.friesian.com/quiz.htm, accessed Dec. 1, 2011).
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“Of course, the people who perpetrated the French or Russian Terrors did not think of what they were doing as non-judgmental experiments. They believed that what they were doing would produce virtue, social justice, the worker's paradise, or something of the sort. For that they needed to have a moral conviction quite independent from any experimental kind of attitude. That moral conviction, ironically, made it possible for them to commit crimes that otherwise we might hope moral conviction would have prevented them from committing: but the latter sort of moral conviction would have derived from traditional inhibitions against killing, while the moral conviction to engage in mass murder was just the sort of rationalistic attitude that Burke criticized” (“Conservatism, History, Progress,” 1996, http://www.friesian.com/conserv.htm, accessed Dec. 1, 2011).
Iris Marion Young: “Contemporary debates among theorists of justice, as Charles Taylor points out, are inspired largely by two practical issues. First, is the distribution of wealth and income in advanced capitalist countries just, and if not, does justice permit or even require the provision of welfare services and other redistributive measures? Second, is the pattern of the distribution of positions just, and if not, are affirmative action policies just means to rectify that injustice? Nearly all of the writers I cited earlier who define justice in distributive terms identify questions of the equality or inequality of wealth and income as the primary questions of social justice” (Justice and the Politics of Difference, 1990, pp. 18-19).
Geoffrey Allan Plauche: “Incidentally, the conception of liberty used by Kleen here equivocates between the libertarian conception (i.e., not being subject to the threat or use of initiatory physical force) and a more left-liberal/socialist conception of liberty as positive economic freedoms. I’m afraid compassionate libertarians cannot get on board with such a conflation. To treat both as a matter of political justice is to try to wed contradictions, because ‘promoting’ positive economic freedoms in this way will necessarily require the violation of rights (liberty). This is the mistake made by statist socialists and left-liberals.
Although Kleen uses the term ‘social justice,’ he actually conflates political justice and social justice here and elsewhere in his post. If one insists on using the term ‘justice’ in reference to positive economic freedoms, it is important to distinguish social justice (more a matter of personal morality and unenforceable in a libertarian legal system) from political justice (liberty/rights, which are enforceable in a libertarian legal system)” (“On Sweatshops, Liberty and Social Justice,” The Libertarian Standard, Nov. 17, 2011, http://www.libertarianstandard.com/2011/11/17/on-sweatshops-liberty-and-social-justice/, accessed Dec. 1, 2011).
David West: “In recent years, and particularly in the English-speaking world, the notion of social justice has come under sustained attack from neo-conservative thinkers. In its conservative and libertarian variants the ‘new right’ both questions the value of social justice and alleges deep-seated problems with the functioning of welfare states ... On the other hand, for many on ‘the left,’ who are unconvinced by the new right’s agenda, both social justice and the welfare state must be defended against these attacks” (“Beyond Social Justice and Social Democracy” in Social Justice: From Hume to Walzer, 1998, p. 232).
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